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AbstrAct: this paper attempts, inevitably briefly, a re-categorization and partial resolution of 
some foundational issues in biology. an initial ground-clearing exercise extends the notion of 
causality in biology from merely the efficient cause to include also final and formal causality.
the human genome Project (hgp) can be looked on as an attempt to ground explanation of 
the phenotype in terms of an efficient cause rooted in a gene. this notion gives rise to the first 
section discussing the computational metaphor and epigenesis and suggesting ways to extend 
this metaphor. the extended notion of causality alluded to above is necessary, but not sufficient, 
to demarcate a specific explanatory realm for the biological. While the universe can ultimately, 
perhaps, be explained by quantum fluctuations being computed through the laws of nature, 
the origin of life remains a mystery. the ground-clearing exercise refers to coincidences that 
motivate the cosmological anthropic principle, before raising an alert about the possibility of 
similar thermodynamic laws facilitating the emergence of life.
life itself seems to involve symbolic operations that can be described by the grammatical rules 
within tightly defined limits of complexity. the nascent field of biosemiotics has extended this 
argument, often in a Peircean direction. yet, even here, the task involved needs to be specified. is 
the organism creating proteins to launch an immune counter-attack? alternatively, is a pluripotent 
stem cell generating an entire organism? We consider what these separate tasks might look like 
computationally.
the paper ends with further delimitation of the specifically biological. at what point in the 
infinitesimal does life refuse to reveal its secrets? Conversely, at what specific levels in increasing 
size and complexity do boundary conditions emerge with hierarchy becoming immanent? 
Keywords: anthropic principle, emergence, computation, hierarchy, causality, biosemiotics, 
thermodynamics, chaoplexity, Waddington, disease
1. intRoduCtion 
to say biology is in “crisis” is, paradoxically, a complement. it is to state that the 
discipline has progressed to the point where contradictions between its putative founding 
principles, actual practices, and results are apparent enough to suggest salutary root-
and-branch reform. this paper will issue such categorical prescription in the area of 
genomics. much of the rest of what follows is simply reflecting best practice in various 
subfields of biology.
yet that is a non-trivial task, particularly as biology becomes invaded by researchers 
from other disciplines like statistics or, as in the case of the present writer, computer 
Cosmos and histoRy212
science. a first stumbling-block is the nature of causal explanation in biology. We 
refugees from the informational sciences tend to think only in terms of aristotle’s 
“efficient cause”. Wiser heads have pointed out that the final, teleological cause was 
necessary as an explanatory gambit for explaining the role of the heart in the circulation 
of the blood; similarly, the role of whole-properties associated with entities like the cell, 
echoing aristotle, has given rise for about a half-century to the notion that organization 
might itself be a cause in the matter.
keller (1995) famously explicated some of the metaphors underlying genomics, at a 
time when the hgP was quickening its pace. While the intellectual fireworks surrounding 
the argument about gene-as-Cartesian-homunculus were indeed spectacular, their 
glare perhaps blinded us to the apparently more prosaic speculations about the nature 
of the gene-as-computer-program. this is particularly the case as “computation” has 
undergone a deconstruction at least as significant as that of “cause”, particularly in the 
work of brian smith (1996); see also Ó nualláin (2007a). echoing again the aristotelian 
distinctions, what underlies genomics is the notion of efficient computability; the purely 
syntactic operations it assumes cannot yield phenotypes while maintaining their formal 
purity as context-independent operations. Ó nualláin (2004, p. 174) summarises the 
situation as an essential tension between the formal requirements of syntax and the real-
world exigencies of intentionality, reference in the real world, be that world a perceptual 
one, as cognitivism would be concerned with, or the biological phenotype. yet, as we 
shall see below, that is just the beginning. 
elsewhere (Ó nualláin,2007d), this author specified the lacunae in current biology. 
the failure of the cognitive, neural and social sciences to explain cognition and 
consciousness; intelligent design/creationism versus “darwinism”; the hgP and its 
problems, wherein biochemistry examples can be given to show the critical importance 
of metabolism (strohman, 2003). on a more fundamental level, we have the observer 
paradox in biology, whereby reductionism results in losing life itself in a mass of 
physicochemical detail. the “Where is the program?” theme addresses itself to the 
massively complex interactions of hox (to be described below), epigenetic factors, types 
of rnas called sirna and microrna, both of which modulate gene expression, and so on. 
all these have consequences for the university-industrial complex, and how to rectify 
matters there in terms of faculty hires and other strategies.
With respect to health and ageing there is ongoing work by bortz (2005), Veech 
and others (2003) on metabolism (particularly as it interacts with diabetes 2, a new 
epidemic based on insulin resistance) and health. in both his academic and more 
popular work, bortz (forthcoming) argues that the attempt to find a “silver bullet” drug 
for diabetes 2 by targeting the biochemical networks involved in getting glucose into the 
cell is misguided; insulin itself is unnecessary if the organisms’s metabolism is, aided by 
exercise, functioning as it should. of course, there now is evidence that exercise prompts 
neurogenesis, thus alleviating depression.
in cancer research, there is an ongoing tension between oncogene (the notion that 
cancer is due to gene mutations) and aneuploid (the notion that cancer is due to gross 
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abnormalities at the chromosomal level) stories, perhaps soon to be resolved by the 
examination of carcinogenesis in the very aneuploid sufferers of “gulf war disease”. 
the metaphysical ground specified as above, it should be stated that the purpose here 
is avoiding methodological blind alleys, and orienting toward appropriate sciences and 
technologies of medicine and agriculture. too often has the discussion ended here with 
an invocation of chaoplexity concerns, and deep regret about the direction of biological 
research. the path here is to be different. 
We are also concerned with bioethics, and the difficult issue of how precisely to think 
about our ecosystem in order to preserve it. according to eliot sober (Ó nualláin, 2004, 
143-149), there can be no bioethics simpliciter, no derivation of “ought” from “is”; rather, 
in the manner of Peter singer (ibid.) with preference utilitarianism, one approaches the 
phenomena from traditional moral standpoints. obviously, we need a bioethics and 
indeed a green politics. this writer believes that we will not be able to prescribe any 
lifestyle and political organisation in our lifetime from a science recognisably continuous 
with that of tradition. there are massive consequences of this, including a privileged 
position for freedom of conscience that precedes any scientific fact in the future. so this 
is also a counterargument to eliminative materialism; the political will forever precede 
the “scientific”
Pace titles like “from molecules to metaphor” (feldman, 2006), let alone the 
strange political momenta seen therein in the abandonment in 2998 of the george 
lakoff Rockridge institution, we are highly unlikely to have descriptions of mind in our 
lifetimes of sufficient cogency for  political prescriptions. however, green parties can 
exploit the formal limits that ecology sets on market capitalism to propose more just and 
sustainable societies. this will take a larger role in our concluding discussion. 
it will be taken as given that the entire apparatus of that heterogeneous body of 
theory and disparate findings we label, variously, as “chaoplexity”, “dynamical systems”, 
“emergence”, and so on and discussed below applies to biological systems as it does to 
the realm dealt with in physics. biology has many better claims for special treatment. 
first of all, there indeed are codes in biology, and the nascent science of biosemiotics 
is well-begotten. secondly, while phase transitions of course exist in the non-biological 
world, it does seems the case that both they and phase boundaries are interrelated in 
biology with a fundamental notion of hierarchy. thirdly, the nature of life does seem 
to invite a biological uncertainty principle, whereby the very existence of investigative 
devices at the nano level and smaller might require us eventually to specify at what scale 
the investigation is purely physics, rather than biology. this, of course, requires us to 
give an account, however tentative, of what life itself is. 
this is an enormously ambitious project for a short paper. luckily, keller (ibid), 
strohman (1993, 2003) and many others have covered the scholarly part of the project 
brilliantly. What this paper will focus on are four themes; first of all, computation 
and its reference to epigenetic explanation; secondly, evolution, metabolism and 
thermodynamics; thirdly, symbols, recursion and phenotypes; fourthly, boundary 
conditions, emergence, and the putative biological uncertainty principle. then, having 
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depicted a specifically social realm discontinuous from the biological, we go on to 
examine consequences in terms of worldview and possible ethical echoes. 
2. ePigenetiCs and ComPutation
deoxyribonucleic acid (dna) is a polymer of four molecular compounds with subunits 
called nucleotides, each of which has a base, a sugar, and one to three phosphates. it 
is read 3 bases at a time, and an amino acid is specified through a complicated process 
involving Rna. amino acids, in turn, are bound together by peptide bonds to form 
proteins. gene expression is the transfer of biological information from the gene to the 
protein; an rna copy of the gene in mrna is made by a polymerase; the mrna binds to the 
ribosome; and there the proteins are constructed from amino acids. three bases specify 
an amino acid. each sequence of three nucleotides in dna is called a codon. these 
code for proteins, which are assembled on the ribosome. Regulatory genes control the 
operation of other genes.
a gene’s most common allele, or variant, is called the “wild” allele. transcription 
factors initiate the transcription of genes and are themselves regulatory proteins 
Retroviruses perform reverse transcription into dna. this seems a priori a counterexample 
to Crick’s deliberately portentous “central dogma” that dna generates rna generates 
proteins.
similarly, the beadle/tatum dogma (1941) of one gene, one protein/enzyme 
was found utterly impracticable;  there must be a generative approach like that for 
modern linguistics which we explore below. molecular biology is ultimately a synthesis 
of informational (including gamow-like cryptographic) and biochemical (“wet lab”) 
approaches. it attempts to use the processes of physics and chemistry in genetics. it 
has been in many ways spectacularly successful; yet, even after the hgP, we have 
straightforward monogenetic correlates of only 2% of diseases. the analogy with 
machine translation by computer, where brute-force methods are currently being touted 
by researchers, after 50 years of other methods, seems apt. 
in Paris in the early 1960’s, Jacob (et al, 1962), monod, and their colleagues produced 
evidence for genes that work at a meta-level, by turning other genes on and off. in 
particular, genes can initiate the activity of sets of other such in particular metabolic 
environments. in the 1970’s the work of Roberts, sharp, and others indicates that much 
dna is “silent”, and a consequence is that “alternative splicing”, a phenomenon like 
prepositional phrase attachment in natural language processing, occurs with genes (Ó 
nualláin, 2007b). at that time Watson (1977) hastened to insist that it is possible that 
a number of proteins could be generated from single “genes” (ibid.). this cautionary 
lesson was lost in the hype about the hgP.
since the advent of multi-cellular organisms 600 million years ago, master genes 
have had to determine what type of expression would take place in different contexts. 
they in turn are governed by ?gspindles?h in the chromatin. the chromatin is a set of 
specialised molecules that protect and control dna. in embryonic cells, therefore, the 
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master regulatory genes are simultaneously repressed and readied for action through 
marks on the ?gspindles?h in the chromatin. the developmental programs directing a 
cell to specialise into, for example, a neuron or liver cell, are initiated by these master 
regulatory genes. these genes produce proteins called transcription factors that bind to 
special sites on the dna and control the activity of lower-level target genes.
of course, the issue of what regulates the master genes comes to mind. the answer 
seems to be related to the spools of protein called histones around which the dna 
strand is looped 1.5 times. this hierarchical form is common to language and music. 
these spools can make the dna accessible to transcription or not, as the occasion 
demands. for example, a complex known as the polycomb tags the spools at a site called 
k27, which signals another set of proteins to make the dna inaccessible Conversely, 
spools tagged on k4 allow the cell to activate the local genes
histone proteins and the nucleosomes they form with dna are the fundamental 
building blocks of chromatin. We are obviously referring to nucleated organisms. histone 
modifications may affect chromatin structure. barbieri (1998, 2002) hypothesises that a 
histone ?glanguage?h may be present that is read by proteins
a recent article (2006) by bernstein, lander, et al, in ?gCell’ looked in detail at the 
chromatin at the points where the master regulatory genes were themselves in turn 
being regulated. they found that the chromatin contained both types of tags, as if the 
genes were being simultaneously readied for action and silenced. this makes sense, as 
most master regulatory genes will be unnecessary, but one will eventually be required. 
likewise, mature cells have resolved into carrying just one or more of the k4 tags. so 
the ?gbivalent?h state in embryonic cells is keeping them poised to go in a number of 
different directions. this has been established for mouse, human, and dog cells. the 
specifics of control seem to involve a network of oct4, sox2, and nanog, known to be 
associated with the embryonic state
the chromatin may give us our first non-human code not specifically related to the 
genetic code, which links dna and amino acids. We will see several more such below.
epigenetics is simultaneously in danger of becoming a catch-all term, and finding 
itself chained in perpetuo to single lab observations like methylated cytosine dna 
markings or acetylated histone markings. for once, scylla and Charybdis truly beckon. 
the sea-monster has been thrown up with the idea that there exists another logical level 
of genetic explanation, that of the epigenome, and that the epigenome manifests itself 
as the genome. so the hgP – or, more correctly, the heP - should be done again, but 
with a broader jurisdiction and terms of reference. the contrasting danger is that of 
identifying epigenetics solely with one observed phenomenon, be that related to stress 
reaction or obesity. 
hidden in the discussion of epigenetics is the issue of where is the program for 
the phenotype. the answer from the boosters of the hgP was the disingenuous “in 
the genes”. the reply from researchers like atlan, koppel, and nijhout (keller, op. 
cit., 28-29) was vociferous; the dna may be merely a data structure within the overall 
computational architecture of the cell. in fact, inheritance may best be regarded as an 
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epigenetic phenomenon in their scenario. it behooves us to unpick this latter lock first.
Conrad Waddington (1966) was concerned, at least at one stage in his varied career, 
with outlining a scenario in which effectively inheritance of acquired characteristics 
could be squared with adherence to the “Central dogma” of molecular biology that 
dna makes rna makes proteins make the phenotype, rather like the more famous 
baldwin effect. his specific mechanisms of epigenetic assimilation and canalization of 
development are of less interest to us here than the notion of the epigenetic landscape 
itself.
the above is the famous depiction of the “epigenetic landscape” and is currently being 
more narrowly interpreted in terms of cell fate with respect to organs, where the ball “fell” 
into one or other chreod, or groove. in fact, Waddington’s concept affords a perspective 
in which organism and environment can coherently be considered as a single unit over 
time (maynard smith, 1958, 1993). this conceptual breakthrough admits of the possibility 
of a converse to “epigenetic assimilation”, the process by which useful characteristics 
are incorporated in to the genome; that is, “environmental assimilation”, a process 
whereby the genome allows mechanisms to be inherited through the environment. 
the grooves, and indeed the whole landscape, can themselves change shape. it is 
likely indeed, given his later posthumous book on chaoplexity, that Waddington (1977) 
would be sympathetic to an idea that saw discontinuities arise in evolution as a result, 
for examples, of catastrophes as one fold in the landscape touched another. (finally, 
this author’s berkeley colleague Richard strohman has written extensively on process 
structuralists like brian goodwin and i do not wish to pre-empt strohman’s publishing 
this work by outlining his as yet unpublished arguments). 
an example of “environmental assimilation” might perhaps be the galapagos finch 
species scandens and fortis (grant et al, 2006). the single species demarker is the song; 
yet this is learned from the father, and has no genetic component. evolutionary biologists 
will recognize the sympatric/allopatric sequence. similarly, monarch butterflies manage 
a multi-generational migration which seems to depend on the disposition of milkweed 
over an an enormous geographical space over eons. if the environment is stable, it 
may be more computationally efficient to allow it rather than the genome to hold 
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the necessary information. indeed, we might find the organism and its environment 
perpetually together at the edge of chaos (kauffman, 2000), as we discuss in the next 
section.
What of computation? here we might learn much from the programming language 
lisp, based as it is on lambda calculus with all the connotations that has for the essence 
of computation itself; lambda calculus is a formally equivalent alternative to the turing 
machine. the general format of lisp is (function arguments); thus (+ 3 4) will return 7. 
(Please note that the parenthesising form is ubiquitous in lisp, leading to the derogatory 
nickname “lots of irritating silly Parentheses”) each form gets handed over to an 
interpreter called “eval” which evaluates it. (the addition of a compiler would strain 
the analogy beyond breaking-point). We may, however, wish to prevent this evaluation 
and can do so by prefacing the structure with a quote; ‘(+  3 4) will simply return (+ 3 
4). this is useful if we are dealing with text. We can write procedures if, for example, we 
wish repeatedly to add 3 and 4 by using defun;
(defun add34 () 
(+ 3 4))
We can invoke it as follows; (add34) which will simply return 7. and so we have a 
correlate to the mapping from sequences of nucelotides to specific amino acids. let’s 
call this level 1 computation.
in common with most programming languages, lisp allows creation of more 
complex functions. these may be triggered by preconditions which we symbolise by 
“cond”; in general, the syntax is
(Cond (critical condition) (action if critical condition is met) 
(t (action if critical condition is not met).
using this schema, we can engage with the Jacob/monod apparatus of operators and 
operons. so we wish beta-galactoidase to be made if lactose is present; otherwise, we 
wish nothing to be done (with a report ‘null)
(defun lactose () 
(Cond ((sugar (setq beta-galactoidase ‘t) 
(t ‘null)))))
at any point, then, we can all the function lactose to probe the environment to see if a 
particular type of transcription should start. let us call this level two. 
so far, then, we have automatic generation of amino acids and conditional initiation 
of transcription. the many brilliant minds behind lisp, however, did not leave matters 
there. While functions can easily be written, it may be the case that we want them to 
be applied to one static piece of text and a variable to be instantiated with a value that 
depends on the context. a technical apparatus called defmacro allows this; briefly, the 
symbol ` requires that the text be left inviolate while ~ (or in “Common” lisp dialect,) 
requires instantiation. now we have ways of nuancing evaluation whereby the same list 
can be data, a function, and partially or wholly evaluated as we wish. the point is that 
if we are to make use of the computational analogy in dna transcription, it helps if it is 
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a more sophisticated one that allows the same stretch of dna to be a transcription unit, 
ignored, or part of an encompassing task.
it is fair to say that we can encompass even the more radical suggestions of nijhout 
with a conception of the genome as now program, now data structure, now a mixture 
of both; now catering only to context-dependent concerns, and now working at a 
level of great abstraction. the ultimate controller is not to be found in any Cartesian 
homunculus, maxwellian demon, or schroedingerian deity, to cite three of keller’s 
(ibid) metaphors; rather, it is ordering principles immanent in the relation of organism, 
species and population in situ over time. 
this writer predicts that it will take many of the greatest minds of the twenty-first 
century much of its span to untangle the chain of control involving the polycomb, 
operators, promoters, micrornas, sirnas, and so on with respect to the environment. 
(in the meantime, the straw man of darwin, innocent of genetics, will confront that 
of yhWh, innocent of the whole of modern science, and great will be the din.) issues 
of control of gene expression must be confronted in an evolutionary context; it may be 
the case, for example, that sirnas prevent too much change to an evolutionarily stable 
phenotype by one-off expression anomalies. 
so far, we have a computational metaphor for automatic and conditional 
transcription. the latter can handle immune reaction, changes due to metabolic 
factors, and so on. it is obviously of much greater interest to try develop an analogy for 
generation of an entire organism. We know (Ó nualláin, 2007a) that hox genes work 
at two levels, at least. at the first level, genetic switches belonging to hox itself specifies 
expression in different longitudinal segments of the body; at another, recognition by 
hox proteins varies gene expression. these are discussed in greater detail in section 5. 
We need to be able to handle factors at a greater level of abstraction using the technical 
apparatus supplied by macros. in particular, we should have a generic macro that can 
specify how a generic body part is made, and have this be instantiated into legs, arms, 
and so on which then have functions to generate them. lisp allows all of this;
(defmacro make-body-part (part)  
` (defun,part,specification-of-part))
so we can then set up the details for variable called “arm” which comprise the 
information that hox uses and then (make-body-part arm) will require that a function 
be generated called “arm” that, in self-referential fashion, works on its own definition of 
itself qua data structure..
i wish to emphasise that all of the above is metaphorical; the cell is not a lisp 
interpreter, and the functions, macros, etc do not provide anything like the requisite 
complexity needed. however, lisp is a much better computational tool for thought 
than the various concepts keller (1995) so ably exposes as the core of late twentieth 
century thinking about the gene and then, equally ably, deconstructs; maxwell’s demon, 
descartes’s homunculus, and so on. 
in this section, then, we looked at some basic mechanisms of gene expression, and 
attempted to consider the computational environment in which such expression occurs. 
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Waddington’s notion of the “epigenetic landscape” was returned to the larger context in 
which it was devised; that of the co-evolution of organism and environment over time. 
3. eVolution, metabolism and theRmodynamiCs
strohman (2003) stressed several issues about thermodynamics and biology. first 
of all, no gene expression can operate as a deus ex machina; it must conform to the 
laws of thermodynamics and kinetics. indeed, the theory of evolution must need be 
incomplete without continual reference to such laws. Conversely, the organism can 
handle great genetic insult if the ancient biochemical pathways maintain their integrity. 
he lauds the emphasis by physician-researchers like Walter bortz(2005) on metabolism 
in maintaining health.
Remarkably, the argument about metabolism can be extended to consideration of 
the origin of life itself. (this is distinct from the set of arguments about one versus two 
membranes ab initio; see Cavalier-smith, 2006 ). it is perhaps clear that the chicken/egg 
quandary concerning the fact that replication requires a critical number of nucleotide 
replicants which cannot get together without replication already being in place is 
unresolvable from first principles. While shapiro (2007) successfully compiles a list of 
arguments against dna-first and rna-first theories, orgel’s (2008) posthumous rebuttal 
argues that the perceived inadequacy of these theories is insufficient to motivate adoption 
of metabolism-first. in particular, he stresses the current paucity of non-enzymatic 
thermodynamically stable chemical pathways that are thus demonstrably abiotic; yet 
he leaves the door open that some such may be discovered.
in his dublin exile (for immersion in what he called “this remote and beautiful 
island” he and his wife regularly, if quietly, thanked the fuehrer) schroedinger chanced 
on the notion of negentropy as a defining factor of life. While keller (1995, 66-78) is 
rightly keen to invoke maxwell’s demon in her exegesis of schroedinger, we now have a 
superior vocabulary of dissipative systems, and chaoplexity has gifted us, inter alia, with 
the realisation that even abiotic systems like hurricanes can exist, negentropically, far 
from thermodynamic equilibrium. 
several other ordering principles are carried over from the physical realm. it will 
never do simply to invoke the deity to explain life, or even gratuitously in a scientific 
context á la schroedinger. however, it is as well to say that life could not have emerged 
without the masses of the electron and proton at about 1836 (barrow, 2002, P. 166). 
likewise, immanent ordering laws are present not just in feigenbaum’s constant in 
chaoplexity, wherein the ratio between orbits at that rate seems to herald the onset of 
behaviour driven by a strange attractor, but also in the simple fact that a log scale of 
mass plotted against size in animals gives a nearly straight line (barrow, 2002, P. 47). 
similarly, the fine structure constant might be tweaked slightly without many adverse 
result, but make it much bigger and there can be no atoms (op. cit. 141-2). finally, reduce 
nuclear forces slightly and there can be no biochemistry (ibid.). the number of photons 
per proton, the ratio of dark versus luminous matter, the specifics of the expansion of the 
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universe all bear similar witness (op cit. 182)
the coincidences that proponents of the anthropic principle rely on continue further. 
fred hoyle, the major opponent of the theory he derisively labelled “big bang”, theorised 
and then established that carbon exists only because the production of oxygen is non-
resonant (op. Cit 153-154). likewise, kauffman (2000, 157) cites theory from horowitz 
that the biosphere is at an energy per unit volume that permits the maximum expansion 
of molecular diversity. 
shapiro (ibid) stresses the critical importance for metabolism-first models of the 
prior existence of the following components; a boundary (ie a primitive membrane), 
an energy source, a linking mechanism(so that energy can be used), and a chemical 
network. he adds that the network must grow and reproduce and will at some point 
welcome a replicator., thus allowing death by “wearing out” to enter nature.  at this 
point, we can perhaps dare to call the result “life”, while remaining attentive to orgel’s 
caveats. 
We should perhaps investigate the use of concepts from complexity and dynamical 
systems theory in general. obviously, many of these terms are an expression of skepticism 
about the current state of our knowledge, epitomised by the word “chaos” itself. in a 
dynamical system, a fixed rule describes the time dependence of a point in geometrical 
space. “emergence” refers to complex pattern formation from simple rules. a complex 
system is one with emergent properties. Chaotic motion is bounded, sensitive to initial 
conditions, and has dense periodic orbits. We can talk of basins of attraction like those 
that the brain settles into; 
fixed point ; dampened pendulum 
limit cycle; heartbeat when resting 
strange attractor; has non-integer dimensions and its dynamics are chaotic
kauffman (ibid.) argues that nature always drives the nexus of organism and environment 
over time to the “edge of chaos”, maximum creativity. his is one of the most serious 
recent attempts to create new foundations for biology continuous with physics and 
chemistry, yet honouring the incredible complexity of life
kauffman states that life emerges from complex chemical reactions. he then 
introduces the notion of “ autonomous agents” that can replicate and do one work cycle, 
normally far from thermodynamic equilibrium. they will be crucial, and he regards 
them as a new ontology of processes and events. he argues that there is a current crisis 
of explanation; an explanatory circle involving work, constraints, measurements, energy 
records, processes, events and - particularly – organization. We have adequate accounts 
of matter, energy, entropy, and information. kauffman. is strongest when he draws 
consequences from chaoplexity. 
in similar vein to his invocation of horowitz above, who argues that the biosphere 
is at an energy per unit volume that permits the maximum expansion of molecular 
diversity, he argues that networks in cells exist near a phase transition between order 
and chaos. so the number of attractor states in the cell is the root of the number of 
genes (about 158) and the cell can cycle around all these states in a couple of days. he 
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argues in this context that communities of molecular autonomous agents may evolve to 
apparently discrete phase transitions  like    going to the edge of chaos or a self-organized 
criticality.  the ordered and chaotic regimes and phase transitions between them are 
characteristic of a class of non-linear parallel dynamical systems.
ecology is a fortiori a happy hunting-ground for proponents of emergentism 
(Williams et al, 2000) and indeed power laws (Williams et al, 2001) wherein linearity is 
left behind as a template for species distribution.there are many competing paradigms 
in ecology, which will have the above apparatus of chaoplexity repeatedly used on 
it.. for example, metabolic theory relates metabolism to body mass and temperature 
and derives useful items like speciation. at a higher logical level, spatial macroecology 
looks at how patterns in the distribution and abundance of species vary across spatial 
scales. thermodynamic considerations include the fact that things never self-organise 
in a closed system entropy production is maximised in irreversible processes; from this 
fact, as some argue, the other phenomena like species area laws fall out naturally. for 
example, is the greenness of earth maximising dissipative heat flow?
in this section, then, we have been careful to consider emergent ordering principles 
throughout all of nature, particularly when these are of a non-linear nature. 
4. symbols, ReCuRsion, and PhenotyPes
the new field of bioemiotics stresses that with the advent of life comes also the 
existence of codes that are by definition not informationally dependent on the appearance 
of their carrier. the strong biosemiotics position is that biology is above all about 
communication. Codes include the genetic code; codes for apoptosis, or programmed 
cell death; histone codes; and so on. Witzany ( Ó nualláin 2007c and d) specifies code-
editing as the essence of life, and a process that links us humans to the biosphere as a 
whole.
let us first look at some of the basic tenets of biosemiotics (see barbieri 1998, 2002, 
2007). (bios=life; semion=sign). sebeok pointed out that signs used by animals are 
processed in the same way as humans’ signs; his term, zoosemiotics, was later extended 
to plants as well and thus “biosemiotics”, coined by Rothschild in 1962, became common 
currency. much of the theoretical infrastructure comes from Peirce who asserted there 
is a trio of sign, object (meaning), and interpretant in any act of signification. signs must 
signify something; conversely, meanings require signs for their completion. a semiotic 
system connects meanings and signs through a code; all three elements are necessary. 
this contradicts saussure, for whom a semiotic system was “signifier and signified”, with 
the values of each deriving from their patterned differences with other such (the author 
wishes to thank an anonymous reviewer for this formulation),
the biosemiotics credo a la barbieri is that organic coding requires signs, meaning, 
and an adaptor. this is a variation on Peirce. the physicalist notion is that “biological 
information” is a metaphor. this is denied by most biosemioticians; they say, for 
example, that genes and proteins are artifacts, made by molecular machines, and this 
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artifactual property is the essence of life. thus, it refutes this physicalist idea
genes and proteins are molecular artifacts because they are created by molecular 
machines. life is “artifact-making”. artifacts require entities like sequences and codes 
to be characterised. nevertheless, organic information and organic meaning are not 
metaphors, but as real as any “natural’ process. We call their results “nominable’ entities 
which require an ordered listing of their elements for identification. shannon’s concept 
of information, based on boltzmann’s equation about the relationship between entropy, 
microstate, and macrostate, does not specify sequence subunits. however, biological 
information does, and is thus a nominable entity. organic meaning mediates between 
molecules
any organic code links two independent worlds (e.g. genes and proteins) by a third 
world (e.g. Rna). “sign, meaning, and adaptor” is pertinent rather than “sign, meaning, 
and interpretant”.according to barbieri, therein lies a crucial distinction between 
objective and subjective. early in the history of the biosphere, chemical “bondmakers” 
got created; some of them acquired the ability to join nucleotides togetherwith respect 
to a template, and are “copymakers”. as proteins require mrna, transfer rna (trna), and 
the ribosome, they are more complex than copymakers. there is no necessity in the 
relationships between dna and amino acids, or between proteins and their eventual 
destination in the cell; we therefore can speak of codes. 
a code is a set of rules that establishes correspondence between elements of two 
independent worlds. barbieri (2007) has repeatedly argued that trna, with two spatially 
and informationally distinct loci that represent codons and amino acids is the beginning 
of the emergence of an arbitrary code. organic information, it bears repetition is, 
according to biosemioticians, objective and irreducible. there are a plethora of codes 
in nature including;
the genetic code; the mapping from dna nucleotide sequences to amino acids
signal transduction codes in cells: Cells continually respond to their environment; 
yet, the hundreds of possible “first” messages are transformed into combinations of only 
4 “second” messages
the spliceosome features recognition of either end of scores of introns for each 
“gene”. so we can talk about “splicing” codes
the cytoskeleton is anchored to the cellular structure in an arbitrary fashion
there also are sugar codes, apoptosis codes, and so on.
so we can produce some summary statements as follows: the cell is a semiotic 
system with genotype, phenotype, and ribotype. the basic processes in life are coding 
and copying. the basic processes in evolution are natural selection and natural 
convention. semiosis is defined by “coding”, not interpretation. signs and meanings 
are codemaker-dependent. they are nominable, that is they can be specified by 
naming their components in their natural order. Rna and proteins also are codemaker-
dependent. the translation apparatus is a semiotic system.
in classical semiosis; a (the interpretant) interprets b (the object) as representing C 
(the “meaning”).
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this is called the “interpreter” model. the “codemaker” model has a (the adaptor, 
like tRna), operating on b (the “sign”, like the genes), to produce C (the “meaning’, 
like amino acids). (the scenario to be outlined below reserves meaning for function 
in the environment). since codes are arbitrary, learning their application is context-
dependent. genes are made by copymakers, proteins by codemakers.
several variations on what biosemioticians do exist. for sebeok, life and sign 
science imply each other. Communication is exactly what distinguishes living from 
nonliving. an organism is a device which communicates its structure to its offspring. 
for emmeche, it is a branch of general semiotics, and its place in nature has yet to 
be determined. for hoffmeyer, unification of biology depends on emphasising the 
semiotics nature of life. sharov, largely in agreement, contends that it should be viewed 
both as biology and semiotics, not as a branch of the latter. Pollack introduces how our 
understanding of the genetic code, which burgeoned between the 1950’s and 1970’s, has 
unified the notion of text and organism. Pattee added the notion that communication 
is the essential characteristic of life, and hoffmeyer the notion that the organism itself 
is a message. uexkuell, following Piaget, wrote about organisms as interpreters of their 
environment. 
Pattee (2001) is one of the chief theorists in the area. he argues that “semantic 
closure” is the crux for autonomy of systems. thus, they reproduce themselves in the 
future and define their identity through the process of self-reproduction. “self ” is a 
semiotic term, but is handled well in immunological theory.
he emphasises the epistemic cut, the separation of rate-independent symbols from 
the rate-dependent dynamics they control. the converse is measurement, the coding of 
dynamic processes into symbols. 
for him, there is a general issue about bridging the gap between the observer and 
the observed, the controller and the controlled, the knower and the known, mind and 
brain; the epistemic cut.
in perhaps an excessive move (despite the fact of Pattee’s original formation in 
theoretical physics), he argues that the process of measurement in Qm falls under the 
same rubric as biological processes. (in a forthcoming paper in biosemiotics, i explain 
why i find the move excessive).
Pattee extends the epistemic cut to a variety of distinctions; observer and observed, 
knower and known, genotype and phenotype. so the answer to the question about 
the distinction between living and nonliving is complex. the “motion of inorganic 
corpuscles” is rejected; there is no merely physical delimiter. there is an epistemic cut, 
with both constraints and dynamics. in short, local and unique heteropolymer constraint 
determined the origin of life.
the perspective in this paper is that the biosemiotic position, as enunciated by 
barbieri, has merit with respect to novelty in evolution and the overall perspective 
afforded. in particular, the nexus of histones, epigenesis, sirnas and metabolism 
described above can best be approached using suitably sophisticated linguistics. let us 
try and grapple with this subject, using a generative approach.
Cosmos and histoRy224
We should distinguish between grammar, the totality of a person’s linguistic 
knowledge, and “grammar” (lower-case), which we’ll restrict to syntax. a grammar in 
the generative tradition is a set of re-write rules that generates (ideally, all and only) 
the sentences of a language (l). the vocabulary V = a,b,c....is the tokens forming the 
elements of the l. a sentence s (e.g. bca) is a string of these tokens
l is all sentences each of which is a string over V. We also have non-terminals like 
nP and VP, etc, to complement the terminals a,b,c....
the Chomsky hierarchy posits languages of different levels of formal complexity; we 
can formulate general grammatical rules at each level. the top level, level 0, languages 
modelled by non recursively-enumerable sets and the next level, level 1 recursively 
enumerable such, are outside our scope here (Ó nualláin (2007b, 253-254). type 2, 
context-sensitive grammars, have rules of the form s (sentence, or protein sequence) is 
rewritten as X if a precedes X and b follows it
s- >X/ab
We can also have hox genes generating contexts or “fields” in this manner. With respect 
to our language analogy, “sonic hedgehog” type genes allow context-sensitive rules. 
Carroll (2005, 42) cites experimental work by saunders showing that transplantation of 
a chunk of tissue from a posterior to an anterior part of developing chicken’s wing-bud 
resulted in “fingers” being developed in the reverse order to what they would have been. 
thus if “a” and “p: stand, respectively, for anterior and posterior contexts, we can write 
the following rules;
s- >a/3,4
s- >p/4,3
hox genes, then, allow for context-sensitive operations. it cannot be proven that 
any randomly chosen level 2 language can be recognised in finite time; likewise, 
computational problems at this level cannot have posited of them a solution in finite 
time. these connections are reminiscent of the unexpected connections between 
fractals and chaos; a priori, there is no reason to anticipate this type of phenomenon. 
daley et al (2003) provide further light on this intriguing area. natural languages in 
general seem susceptible to formalisation by an indexed grammar, which caters to the 
context-sensitive examples found by various linguists in human language (Ó nuallain, 
2003, 101-128)
Phenomena like alternative splicing (ast, 2005) indicate that there is some degree of 
ambiguity, and thus complexity in gene expression one hypothesis is that proteins are 
semantic primitives, rather than “meaning”at the syntactic level, bcl-x, which governs 
cell death, can be alternatively spliced into bcl-x (s), a promoter of cell-death, and bcl-
x(l), a suppressor thereof (Ó nualláin (2007b, P. 251). this is structural ambiguity; to be 
more specific, it is a problem of prepositional phrase attachment, which needs access 
to the semantic or a deeper level to be resolved. so “the man shot the girl with the 
gun” leaves issues about his culpability. the nature of this layer has been approached 
by bentilola (2005) who stresses the fact that living organisms have immense, dynamic 
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memories; each act, reflects all previous acts. 
let us introduce type 3 grammars with an example; playing tennis and “plugging” 
one’s opponent’s backhand before playing a cross court to the forehand. We do not want 
to generate bf; that is over-generation, but all and only the winning rallies. We need at 
least two backhands, so bbf, bbbf, bbbbf, etc are winning rallies. to write the grammar, 
we need to introduce a non-terminal e (upper-case for these). We can define e –> 
bf. We also write a recursive rule e – >be if we add s- >be, where s is a full rally (or 
sentence)we now have the full grammar. 
a critical non-human code is the starling’s song, analysed by tim gentner et 
al (2006)., and found to conform to a recursive grammar. it took 15,000 trials with 
differential reinforcement to get this effect
birds were asked to pick out songs with inserted rattling or warbling phrases. 9 of 
11 succeeded 90% of the time the same task was attempted, and failed by tamarin 
monkeys used by mark hauser. he argues that the starlings do not have semantics, even 
if the recursive phenomenon is correct
type 4, regular grammars, look like keyword systems; this/that is/was alive/dead 
which can generate just the sentences “this is alive”, “that was dead” and so on. the 
hgP was implicitly based on type 4, or finite-state automaton, even at the hgP’s most 
enlightened moments. the rest of the time, the hgP behaved as if the genome was 
similar to the parody of language apparent in the pattern-matching programs of the 
1960’s. lisp programs were programmed in these systems with preprogrammed scripts 
like “i have problems with my x”, to which they would reply “tell me more about x”. it 
is likely that parsing the genome is infinitely more complex than this. Ó nualláin (2007b) 
explores this issue in detail
in gene expression then, as in language, it is suggested here that contexts, are 
idiosyncratic interactions between linguistic and operational knowledge, which require 
knowing the precise relationship between the words (the genes) and semantic formalism 
(the metabolic context) in order for correct processing to occur (in order to predict what 
proteins will be generated). it is likely indeed that all of this holds for gene expression 
(Ó nualláin 2007b)
specifically, context seems to deform the layers of language as it becomes restricted 
in much the same way that gravity deforms space-time as one approaches the surface 
of a planet. (ibid.). the hgP worked on the assumption that the context was always 
going to be sufficiently restricted for single words to work, and therein lies its failure. 
it is a valuable lexicographic tool, and therein lies its success. however, we also need 
syntax, semantics, discourse pragmatics, and enumeration of contexts if nl is anything to 
go by. the hgP may be looked at alternatively as having elicited context-independent 
semantic primitives, or discovering unambiguous collocations, or as doing a lexicon. 
time will tell which is the most fruitful perspective.
We must try and understand the metabolic context for the particular cases that 
Veech et al (for example, in their 2001 paper) examine or the “cytoplasmic regulatory 
protein components” (bentilola, 2005). then comes issues of “discourse structure”; how 
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tasks like building and maintaining the integrity of the organism act as high-level goals 
affecting the minutiae of protein generation, which we outlined above
With respect to gene expression research then, exemplified by the exaggerated 
claims being made in hgP research, it looks like remaking all the same mistakes made 
in ai. indeed, the search for an “epigenome” where all will be revealed corresponds 
precisely to the search for an interlingua in machine translation, which was an almost 
complete failure (Ó nualláin, 2003).likewise, the attempt to introduce bayesian nets 
between genotype and phenotype resembles nothing so much as expert systems which 
have been revealed to be either context-dependent or else of very little practical use.
5. boundaRy Conditions, emeRgenCe, and a biologiCal 
unCeRtainty PRinCiPle
following maynard smith, barbieri (2007, P. 16) outlines a set of “major transitions”; 
genes, proteins, first cells, eukaryotes, embryos, mind and language. there is an 
emergentist ethos here that cannot be gainsaid. We can also discern a hierarchy of 
natural law regimes from the level of the biosphere to that of populations to single species 
to groups, individuals, organs and cells; and now plasmon rulers, optical tweezers and 
so on allow investigation at scales hitherto inconceivable. at the nanometer level, X-ray 
crystallography is appropriate; above 200 nm, light-ray microscopy. it is possible that 
characteristics of life itself will not emerge at these dimensions. as we progress up the 
hierarchy from the genes to the biosphere, there are boundary conditions at each level. 
for example, the genome can be considered as the set of boundary conditions for the 
making of proteins. 
 for the moment, let’s look at an intermediate dimension, that studied by 
evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo). Just as CeRn attempts to intuit aspects 
of cosmogenesis by studying subatomic interactions, so evo-devo attempts to study 
evolution by looking at laboratory incidents of gene expression. hox genes, which we’ve 
alluded to several times, belong to the homeobox gene family, a gene sequence that 
determines how the body develops from the first stages of embryogenesis. after the 
anterior-posterior and dorsal-ventral axes of the body are established, hox genes pattern 
the body into distinct segments, and within-segment patterns of cell fate determination. 
thus, hox genes determine where limbs and other body segments grow during 
development. the homeobox is a 180-basepair sequence of dna and the polypeptide 
domain it encodes is called the homeodoman, about 60 amino acids long. homeobox 
genes encode transcription factors.
there are four families of hox genes for different body areas in mice and all other 
mammals as in fruit flies. the evolution of body form in both arthropods and vertebrates 
has been achieved by shifting hox genes up and down the main axis. “if the impossibility 
of formation of a complex organ through a series of small changes was ever to be proven 
my theory would have certainly collapsed. however i could not find such an organ...” 
(darwin, 1964, page 189.) along with alternative splicing (short et al, 2008), hox provides 
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a realm of plausibly non-small changes. 
We have seen that hox genes function with switches at two levels; one set belongs 
to the hox genes themselves, and specify their expression in the different segments of 
the animal, and the other involves recognition by hox proteins to vary gene expression. 
the 1980’s and 1990’s saw the identification of hox genes in drosophila. for example, 
drosophila’s front wings are large, flat, venated, and powered for flight. the hind wings 
are balloon-shaped, smaller, and used for balance the difference is due to a hox gene 
called ultrabithorax (ubx). this is activated in the hind wing to ensure that venation 
does not occur. ubx switches off genes that encourage venation. tool kits like these can 
be used again and again.
in fact, much recent evolution can be thought of in terms of the shifting of hox 
genes up and down the body axis. the bat’s wing, horse’s leg, whale’s flipper and human 
hand are homologously formed by homologous genes along homologous developmental 
pathways. the pax-6 or eyeless gene regulates eye development from our camera-type 
eyes to the fly’s compound eyes. When the gene is manipulated to turn it on in other 
parts of the fly, we get eye tissues in the wings, legs, and so on. this also applies if the 
mouse eyeless gene is turned on in the fly.
Returning to drosophila, bithorax mutations produced flies with an extra pair of 
wings. antennapdia mutation transformed antenna into legs. these confirmed that there 
might be genes that controlled large-scale patterns of whole-body architecture, including 
positional information on the body axis. a mutation in human hox d13 produces an 
extra finger. homeosis describes modifications of the anatomical themes and variations 
in body form. these genes have remained relatively unchanged throughout evolutionary 
history, and the complex may have evolved from a single ancestral hox gene.
in flowers, we get the same theme of serially repeated structures arranged in a 
systematic order, with repetition in linear-concentric symmetry rather than linear-
bilateral symmetry. the multifunctionality of tool kit genes provides evidence for the 
notion of evolutionary descent from a few common ancestors. so we find that the 
bCmP gene, expressed in different contexts, can govern development of ribs, outer 
ear, and thyroid cartilage. mc1r and agouti can both cause melanism. mc1r is known to 
cause melanism in a set of light and dark pocket mice in arizona. 475 miles away in new 
mexico, it is cause by an as yet unknown mechanism. note what we have been saying; 
the biological correlate to “meaning” in language is not proteins generated, but function 
in the environment, and again we emphasise context
While the concept of the “biological uncertainty principle’ has recently been misused 
for “silent” dna, it has a more venerable proponent;
“in every experiment on living organisms there must remain an uncertainty as 
regards the physical conditions to which they are subjected, and the idea suggests itself 
that the minimum freedom we must allow the organism will be just large enough to 
permit it, so as to say, to hide its secrets from us. on this view, the very existence of 
life must in biology be....(like the quantum action) taken as a basic fact that cannot be 
derived from ordinary mechanical physics” (bohr, 1933)
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it is possible that life needs an interlocked self-contained metabolic system protected 
by some membrane that also includes the possibility of self-replication and therefore 
some kind of, paradoxically vicarious, survival after death. the resulting complex has 
emergent properties that several of the tools available today are too tiny to detect; 
precisely bohr’s point. 
let us leave this section with a brief foray into the id/darwin minefield. fodor 
(1975) successfully argued that all human knowledge must be innate on totally logical 
grounds; a new concept is by definition discontinuous from the old (Ó nualláin, 
2003 91-92). the iders will continue to use this type of rhetorical device successfully, 
particularly if their opponents insist on referring to darwin, whose notion of inheritance 
actually precluded evolution insofar as it was at all coherent. indeed, they will probably 
win arguments specifically about speciation, let alone the major transitions referred 
to above. evolution, with its multitude of mechanisms including endosymbiosis and 
genetic drift, must be rescued from darwin.
6. mind and the disContinuity of the soCial and biologiCal
Witzany (2006, 2007) has laudable goals in his Weltanschauung; they are to establish 
the social as continuous with the biological, and inculcate a reverence for life. the 
argument to be made in this short section is that this goal is misguided. in the first place, 
it is a category error; the social is a different category to the biological. Ó nualláin 
(2003, 169) cites work by dyer that testifies to the extremely difficult path from biological 
process to symbolic behaviour. yet that is still within the realm of the biological; what is 
not is a notion of a norm.
this author’s work  (Ó nualláin, forthcoming) attempts, inter alia, to provide a 
foundation in cognitive science for social science concepts. it begins with the concept of 
selfhood, which is posited in the writer’s experimental work as being founded on data-
compression in the brain. in particular, our experience of selfhood qua identification 
derives from exclusion of data regarded by the organism either as irrelevant or as 
dangerous to its integrity. our experience of ourselves as agents is largely a fiction in 
that we narrate continually, ascribing to ourselves the origins of actions that occurred 
automatically. however, there is a core of agency within each of us, while manifest 
perhaps in a conscious “won’t” rather than “will”.
the social is a higher category to the cognitive, which refers to the processing of 
information in the individual brain, and to the non-cognitive biological, yet is rooted 
in both. insofar as the individual can construe herself as being the object of a norm 
or value, she is immersed in the social. this can be mediated as intersubjective, and 
not necessarily conscious, or fully conscious. social pressures can be exerted on the 
individual, with often devastating results. some such are artifacts of colonisation; yet 
that is getting ahead of the story.
the expression of the social is primarily verbal, and that will be our first port of call. 
it can be argued that all human institutions are created by speech acts, whereby concepts 
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previously abstract acquire rights and duties, and power over the individual; deontic 
powers. the particular types of speech acts involved are called performative utterances, 
which take the form “X institution shall...”. and so it can be said, for example, that a 
certain limited company shall exist within a certain legislative framework for a certain 
amount of time, including for eternity. 
yet the words alone will not unravel the web in which critical theory finds that humans 
live. While it is perhaps excessive to state that behind the structure of modernity lies the 
mediaeval, there is undoubtedly ample room for projection, and indeed scapegoating. 
the contemporary critic might indeed go further and point to the access of torture and 
Christian crusade in the early years of the 21st century to suggest something altogether 
darker. admixed with freedom of conscience are themes a great deal lower in the brain 
than the cortex.
therefore, the social realm can be expressed as laws, norms and values; it is a mark 
of legislative failure that biological concerns intervene to destabilise a regime. it is a 
symptom of maladaptation, whether cause by himself or the society, that an individual 
should have to focus on the facts of his biological being, rather than objective conditions, 
in order to resolve a personal crisis.
finally, one can consistently follow barbieri (2007) who, perhaps by oversight, 
omitted consciousness from the major transitions. it can consistently be argued that 
consciousness existed eternally, and that what is happening in the case of our individual 
experience is that the intentional structure of the mind is “bathed” by consciousness. 
this allows us to create the largely fictitious selves that we have through narration to 
ourselves; yet such narrations are the personal correlate of those inevitable forces that 
we call “social”
7. the foundations of biology and ConseQuenCes
let us now recapitulate with some summary points. 21st century biology will possibly 
be as consequential to its century as physics was to its predecessor:
darwin must be sacrificed for the sake of the stupendous theory of evolution 1. 
which is emerging, which draws its evidence from the subatomic as from hox 
genes.
some kind of anthropic principle will always be invokable to explain the origin 2. 
of life, of multicellularity and all the other major transitions as it is for apparent 
coincidences like the value of the fine structure constant
Recursive symbolic function is a fact of nature.3. 
there does exist a biological uncertainty principle at a scale much larger than 4. 
the physical one.
some aspects of the emergence of novelty will remain forever mysterious.5. 
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a new, more elaborate version of computation must be used for cellular 6. 
function.
in a post-dissipative systems world, it is helpful to define life also in terms of 7. 
replication after death.
the interaction between metabolism and symbol-processing that is present at 
all levels of life that makes biology so difficult, has enormous consequences. gene-
expression is subservient to ancient metabolic pathways; gmos may indeed be filtered 
out by pure thermodynamics (but not before they have done much damage). agriculture 
undoubtedly needs to focus more on the integrity of the ecosystems that it undoubtedly 
disrupts. in medicine, while prevention, including exercise, is undoubtedly currently 
more efficient than cure, the advent of “prospective medicine”, which predicts illnesses 
50 years away, suggests a different argument. While an emphasis on metabolism, with 
its integrity undamaged by insult to the phenotype is correct, a return to socialized 
medicine a la europe will work even better. Corporate medicine will always find a way 
to exploit the individual.
so we end with the political infringing on the biological. in this context, it is worth 
saying that even a cursory look reveals a stupendous epic of evolution resulting in our 
current state. it is indeed just a story; yet so also the rest of our knowledge is subject 
to the restrictions of these evolved brains. it is as ridiculous to impose metaphysical 
censorship on ourselves as we, with awe, contemplate our origins as it is to accept as 
gospel—well, the bible. it is possible to develop a politics based on the integrity of 
ecosystems as long as it is realised that our capacity for symbol use, and our very selves 
are also part of nature. to assert a “green” politics is also to assert the finest heights of 
human culture, and its extraordinary perennial search for the absolute grounds of its 
own existence. 
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